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Abstract 
In great part thanks to Manny Schegloff’s contributions, CA has brought with it a 
fresh new way of thinking about language. Three roughly chronological stages can 
be identified in Schegloff’s linguistic development: (1) casual observation about 
small-scale linguistic phenomena, including silence, timing of sounds, syllables and 
words, non-lexical tokens, reference and deixis; (2) serious engagement with large-
scale linguistic phenomena, including sentences, questions, speech acts, coherence, 
and prosody; (3) full-blown linguistic theorizing about, e.g., the natural habitat of 
language and grammars as positionally sensitive objects. The conclusion is that 
Manny Schegloff has contributed, if unwittingly, to a ‘new-age’, interactional 
revolution in linguistic thinking. 
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1 This is the slightly redacted version of a presentation given at the 10th International Pragmatics 
Conference in Göteborg, Sweden, in July 2007 in the panel „Finding the universal in the particular: 
A panel honoring Emanual A. Schegloff on his 70th birthday”. I am grateful to the editors for 




From the first publication of "Sequencing in conversational openings" in 1968 to 
the occasion for this Festschrift adds up to more than forty years of legendary 
productivity. This chapter aims to pay tribute to Manny Schegloff and his oeuvre by 
trying to assess what these forty years have meant for the discipline of linguistics 
and how that discipline is practised today. Over the past twenty or so years, those 
who have been able to observe, first-hand, the reception of Conversation Analysis 
and of Schegloff's work among linguists will know that it has ranged from 
admiration and fiery enthusiasm to skepticism, suspicion, and doubt. The reactions 
have not been independent of the personalities involved. Yet if we abstract away 
from the personal and try to assess quite soberly what the field of linguistics has 
gained from these past forty years of CA work, the conclusion can only be: it has 
gained a lot. 
It is well known that a view from the outside can be salutary. Linguistics has 
profited greatly in the past from outside views. In the early twentieth century some 
of the best and most impressive grammars of the English language were written by 
‘foreigners’: Poutsma, Curme, Kruisinga, Jespersen, to name only the most well-
known. Needless to say, a view from the outside brings with it both opportunities 
and risks. One of the risks is that the outsider will be accused of talking about 
something he or she knows nothing about. One of the opportunities is that precisely 
because the outsider is 'free' of all the conventional baggage that comes with 
training in the discipline, their vision is clearer. At the end of the twentieth and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, one can venture to claim that CA – in great 
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part due to Schegloff's work – has brought with it a fresh new way of thinking 
about language by taking an unencumbered view from the outside.  
But this has happened rather incidentally. We only need to remember Sacks' 
disclaimer that he was not interested in language per se:  
 
It was not from any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation 
of what should be studied that I started with tape-recorded conversations, but 
simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and again.... 
(Sacks 1984: 26) 
 
Not only was CA's attention to language incidental. It was also radically different, 
because it started – not from pre-established beliefs and theories about language 
passed down through generations of scholarship – but from naive (pre-theoretical) 
and careful observation of what language really looks like when it is used by real 
speakers on real occasions in their everyday lives.  
How did this new view of language develop? On closer examination we can 
identify three stages in Schegloff's linguistic development. 
 
 
I. The beginning stage: Casual observation about small-scale linguistic 
phenomena 
 
It began rather imperceptibly, with CA's notorious "unmotivated looking”. 
Schegloff found himself casually remarking on things that are eminently linguistic, 
because they relate to language, but which no proper linguist had ever thought to 
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investigate. (A proper linguist at the time was a structuralist/generativist who was 
primarily interested in symbolic signs and their systemic relationships to one 
another.) Quite early on, however, Schegloff was taking seriously small linguistic 
phenomena like the following: 
 
1. Silence  
 
Few linguists would ever have thought that the absence of language might be worth 
investigating. But Schegloff (1968), along with Sacks and Jefferson (Sacks, 
Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974), showed that silence can be highly meaningful at 
specified positions in sequential structure (the findings cannot be reviewed here in 
full but a few relevant quotations will serve mnemonic purposes): 
 
If one party issues an S (=summons) and no A (=answer) occurs, that provides the 
occasion for repetition of the S. That is to say, the nonoccurrence of the A is seen 
by the summoner as its official absence, and its official absence provides him with 
adequate grounds for repetition of the S. (Schegloff 1968:364) 
 
...a silence after a turn in which a next has been selected will be heard not as a 
lapse's possible beginning, nor as a gap, but as a pause before the selected next 
speaker's turn-beginning. (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974:715) 
 
Here Schegloff and his colleagues are pointing to linguistic meaning potential in the 
absence of language. It comes about by virtue of speakers withholding language 
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when it would be expected, so that its absence serves as an index to what is 
missing. Some linguists like to talk about ‘zero’ morphs and ‘zero’ anaphora as 
having a bearing on meaning potential, but this kind of ‘zero’ turn-taking goes a 
good deal further. 
 
2. Timing in sounds, syllables, and words  
 
Linguists were of course aware that words are not always articulated the way the 
dictionary says they should be. But these deviations from what a speaker of a 
language was thought to 'know' about that language were considered 'degeneracies' 
deriving from the strain of performance. However, together with Jefferson and 
Sacks (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977), Schegloff (1979) shows that 
disturbances in the flow of speech, in particular as regards timing, are meaningful. 
They “do” something in conversation, namely they signal the relevance of repair: 
 
a variety of non-lexical speech perturbations, e.g. cut-offs, sound stretches, 
'uh's etc.,...signal the possibility of repair-initiation immediately following… 
(Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:367) 
 
The cut-off stops a 'next sound due' from occurring when it is due; the 'uh' 
and pause occupy the position at which a next due element of the talk would 
otherwise be placed (Schegloff 1979:273) 
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What is radically new about this kind of observation from a linguist's point of view 
is that language performance is taken seriously and that language use is treated as a 
contingent accomplishment in real time. 
 
3. Non-lexical tokens 
 
Traditionally, linguists like to think of themselves – and are thought of by others – 
as scholars who deal with meaningful elements like morphemes and words. Sounds 
and sound objects which are not words and/or do not enter into the make-up of 
words are outside their purview. Yet Schegloff (1982) quite early on drew attention 
to uh-huh and "other things that come between sentences" as being potentially 
meaningful:  
 
Perhaps the most common usage of 'uh huh', etc. (in environments other than 
after yes/no questions) is to exhibit on the part of its producer an 
understanding that an extended unit of talk is underway by another, and that 
it is not yet...complete. (Schegloff 1982:81) 
 
…several quite distinct positionings of “uh(m)”—so deployed by speakers 
and so understood by recipients—are to mark the “reason-for-initiating”an 
episode of interaction, that a dispreferred response is upcoming, that a 
dispreferred sequence is being launched, or that a sequence’s ending has 
resisted consummation and is being tried again. (Schegloff 2010:166) 
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What is new here from a linguistic perspective is the idea that something other than 
a symbolic sign, or lexicalized word, can be instrumental in the production of 
language-based discourse. For linguists it already requires a significant frame 
switch to conceptualize discourse as a process rather than as a product. But now 
Schegloff is saying that this process is interactive: sentences are not "born naturally 
whole out of the speaker's forehead, the delivery of a cognitive plan" (Schegloff 
1982:73) but involve the collaboration of others. For the traditional linguist,2 who 
believes that language resides in the individual's head, a statement like this is 
heresy. 
 
4. Reference and deixis 
 
Linguists of course acknowledge that there are deictic expressions in language for 
referring to persons and places whose use and interpretation depend heavily on the 
context of occurrence. Such expressions are, however, usually thought to be limited 
to a small set of indexical words including personal pronouns (I, you, he, she), 
demonstratives such as this or that, and locative adverbs such as here and there. But 
quite early on, Schegloff (1972) argued that all formulations of place are 'recipient 
designed', i.e., their choice depends on the specific circumstances of use: 
 
...for any 'place' there is a set of formulations that are 'correct'. On any 
occasion of employing a term for that 'place' much less than the full set is 
'right'...On each occasion in conversation in which a formulation of location 
                                                
2 This term does not refer to a specific individual but rather to an imaginary figure reuniting all the 
beliefs and assumptions stereotypically assumed to be consensual in the field. 
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is used, attention is exhibited to the particulars of the occasion. (Schegloff 
1972:114f) 
 
Shortly thereafter, together with Sacks, Schegloff made a similar argument with 
respect to reference to persons: 
 
The specification of the general preference for recipient design in the domain 
of reference to persons is: If they are possible, prefer recognitionals. By 
"recognitionals" we intend, such reference forms as invite and allow a 
recipient to find, from some "this-referrer's-use-of-a-reference-form" on some 
"this occasion-of-use", who, that recipient knows, is being referred to (Sacks 
and Schegloff 1979:17) 
 
Later, Schegloff (1996a) made the further point that personal pronouns such as I 
and you should be thought of merely as forms which serve as resources for 
referring to speaker and recipient. They are not the only, or even the unqualifiedly 
‘dedicated’ way of doing so: 
 
…there is a variety of resource forms for person reference at the disposal of 
parties to interaction (...) And there are practices (…) for the accomplishment 
of adequate reference in talk-in-interaction. (Schegloff 1996a:469) 
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Even personal names, he argued, should not be considered ‘objective’ or absolute 
ways of referring to specific individuals but are instead as indexical as is classic 
deixis: 
 
The use of name by a speaker to refer to a person can be as contingent on the 
addressed recipient and the context of usage as any classically deictic form. 
(Schegloff 1996a:478, n26) 
 
What is radical about these observations is that they suggest that to the extent that 
talk is recipient-designed, to that extent language signs in use are indexical.3 This 
opens up the distinct possibility that all of language (use) is indexical. For linguists 
who believe in the mental lexicon as a repository of context-free lexical meaning, 
such a thought is anathema. 
 
 
II. The middle stage: Serious engagement with large-scale linguistic 
phenomena 
 
By the early 1980s, the seeds had been sown for a more thoroughgoing 
investigation of language in conversation. In the next (partially overlapping) stage, 




                                                
3 This thought goes back to the ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel (see Heritage 1984). 
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For linguists in the 1970s, if sentences were anything more than themselves, they 
were monolithic, integral building blocks of the written paragraph. But Schegloff 
(1979) argued that sentences are first and foremost turn-constructional units and 
that their 'integrity' is subordinate to sequential requirements: 
 
...sentences will be in turns and will be subject to the organization of turns 
and their exigencies. (Schegloff 1979:281) 
 
 ... all the types and orders of organization that operate in and on turns in 
conversation can operate on the sentence. (Schegloff 1979:282) 
 
The radical idea here is that there is a syntax-for-conversation that organizes the 
production of turn-constructional units and engages with a 'syntax' of repair 
oriented to re-establishing the progressivity of talk when it is disturbed. How a 
syntax-for-conversation relates to traditional syntax is left unspecified. But the 
possibility is not excluded that it may be different. If so, this amounts to a direct 




Linguists have traditionally had very definite ideas about sentence types. There are 
basically four: declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamative. 
Interrogatives in English typically have subject-auxiliary inversion and are used to 
ask questions. However, Schegloff (1984) casts doubt on this simplistic equation: 
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...whatever defines the class 'questions' as a linguistic form will not do for 
questions as conversational objects, or interactional objects, or social 
actions. ... it will not do, for a variety of reasons, to use features of linguistic 
form as sole, or even invariant though not exhaustive, indicators or 
embodiments of such objects. (Schegloff 1984:49f) 
 
For the linguist, Schegloff's approach to questioning is unsettling because it seems 
to suggest that the questioning activity does not depend in any way upon the 
question form. More generally, it could be taken to imply that function is wholly 
independent of form. Linguists may disagree as to which comes first, form or 
function, but they tend to be unanimous in believing that form cannot be ignored 





Following the seminal work by Austin and Searle in the 1960s and 1970s, linguists 
were quick to embrace the main tenets of speech act theory, especially since the 
theory attributed an important role to linguistic form. In Austin's understanding, for 
instance, speech-act verbs were said to be a rough and ready guide to speech acts: if 
you wanted to know what speech acts are possible, you had only to look at the 
speech-act verbs in language. Yet Schegloff (1996b) discovered robust empirical 
evidence in conversation for a hitherto undescribed 'speech act' for which there is 
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no a priori category and no corresponding speech-act verb: this is the act of 
'confirming allusions': 
 
Until I grappled with a collection of actual, naturally occurring repeats ... I 
had not the slightest idea that there was such a function, such an action, such 
a practice in talk as 'confirming that something had been conveyed 
inexplicitly,' – confirming both the allusion and that it had been an allusion. 
(Schegloff 1996b:210) 
 
Such a discovery comes as a shock to linguists. The import is that non-linguists are 
in a position – perhaps even in a better position ⎯ to discover what things can be 
done with words, because they are not fixated on words or phrases but are 




For the traditional linguist, coherence is something that goes beyond the sentence; it 
is in the purview of the text linguist. But coherence is nevertheless thought to be 
language-related, accountable for in part by cohesive markers of underlying text 
relations and in part by topicality. Yet Schegloff (1990) shows that coherence is 
rather a function of sequential organization: 
 
...the structure of sequences in talk-in-interaction is a source of coherence in 
its own right. Disparate topics can occur coherently within the framework of 
a single, expanded sequence. ... An utterance apparently coherent topically 
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with preceding talk can appear incoherent nonetheless if it is structurally 
anomalous within the sequence it is part of. (Schegloff 1990:72) 
 
Thus, it is not topics but actions that create meaningful courses of actions and it is 
meaningful courses of action that are responsible for coherence. This, too, would 




Linguists have long known about lexical tones and they have even recently come to 
accept that there is a non-segmental (suprasegmental) dimension to language 
structure that is crucial for meaning in discourse. But as a rule, their attention has 
centered on metrical organization (strong and weak syllables) and on focus 
structure (the marking of new or contrastive information through primary pitch 
accent). Yet Schegloff's work on prosody shows that there is an interactive 
dimension to prosody which has nothing at all to do with information structure: it 
involves how speakers modulate their voices in relation to one another, for instance, 
in conversational openings: 
 
...it seems apt to characterize what is underway here as a negotiation over the 
pitch level at which this conversation is to be conducted, at least initially, and 




Here then is reference to a prosodic dimension of language use in interaction, one 
that no proper linguist could ever conceivably discover, much less feel comfortable 
dealing with, because – like 'shared' syntax – it depends crucially on collaboration 
between two parties. It is interactive in the truest sense of the word. Observations 
like this challenge the linguist's understanding of language as residing in the heads 




III. The latest stage: Full-blown linguistic theorizing 
 
In the latest stage Schegloff's thinking has culminated in the treatment of broad 
questions relating to a full-blown theory of language: What is language? What 
should a grammar of language be? 
 
Language in its natural habitat  
 
Most linguists like to think of language as knowledge that is located in the mind. 
But Schegloff (1996c) argues that language is social and is located in talk, 
specifically in turns and turn constructional units: 
 
...turns-at-talk are the key proximate organizational niche into which bursts 




...the ... key unit of language organization for talk-in-interaction is the turn 
constructional unit; its natural habitat is the turn-at-talk; its organization we 
are calling 'grammar'.  (Schegloff 1996c:55)  
 
Thus, language is first and foremost a means for interaction and 'bursts' of language 
are housed in turns-at-talk, or better, in turn constructional units. Turn 
constructional units are produced in real time and are subject to interactional 
contingencies. It is grammar that organizes language in function of its habitat in 
turns. What this means for the linguist is that language cannot be properly studied 
without an appreciation of how talk-in-interaction is organized. The CA-informed 
linguist does not first establish facts about language and then look to see how they 
are borne out in interaction, but rather first analyzes the interaction and then 
examines the language used in it. This amounts to a radical re-structuring of 
priorities. And it implies that linguistic training must include interaction analysis. 
Schegloff (2007) is an ideal tool for this. 
 
Positionally sensitive grammars  
 
The raison d'être of the linguist is "grammar", conceptualized traditionally as 
capturing or embodying all that decontextualized knowledge that speakers have 
about the structure of their language, in particular knowledge about what the 
sounds, words, and syntactic structures of the language are, and also about what 
they could be (and cannot be). This knowledge is thought to be abstract and 
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context-free: it represents what single linguistic forms have in common, regardless 
of which context they may get used in. Yet Schegloff (1996c) argues that grammar 
should be thought of not as context-free but as context-sensitive, as a range of 
resources whose deployment is sensitive to the talk that has come before: 
 
...a possibly relevant organizational form for a next contribution – a relevant 
grammar – (can) be shaped by the immediately preceding talk and action. 
(Schegloff 1996c:110) 
 
And because preceding talk and action can take on many different forms, speakers 
have many different grammars, which are 'positionally sensitive': 
 
One has a range of grammatical resources, grammars if you will, whose 
relevance is positionally sensitive to organizational features and 
contingencies of the sequential and interactional moment in which the 
conduct is situated. (Schegloff 1996c:110) 
 
For a linguist, this is about as radical as one can get. The implications of 
'positionally sensitive grammars' are so far-reaching that they have yet to be fully 
fathomed. But as so much in this extraordinarily rich article, the notion will be a 






If we look at the list of linguistic phenomena – small and large – which Schegloff 
has addressed over more than forty years (and only a small selection has been given 
here), it begins to look like a linguistic handbook – if one with a very special slant: 
 
Silence 
Timing of sounds, syllables, and words 
Non-lexicalized tokens 






Language in its natural habitat 
Positionally sensitive grammars 
 
Manny Schegloff has not only dealt with all of these eminently linguistic topics, he 
has contributed fresh ideas and new insights on each one of them. The conclusion 
then is that, although he may not know it, Manny Schegloff is a linguist (among 
other things). In this capacity, he is to be applauded for having contributed, if 
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